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If  credit  cooperatives  are  to  be  viable  and  help  farmers,
particularly small-scale farmers, they must pay more attention to
the  design  of  their  operations  - to  the  accountability  of
managers, to the structuring of incentives, and to the monitoring
and enforcement of repayments.
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Perhaps  the  most  common  form  of government  intervention  in the
rural  sector  has been  massive  lending  at subsidized  inte-Ost  rates. The
standard  .'ustification  has  been  that  credit  programs  are  easier  to
implement  than  other  policies  such  as land  reform  or infrastructure
development  and  are  beneficial  to agriculture.  Without  subsidized  interest
rates,  adoption  of technical  ilnnovation  would  be delayed  aad  there  would  be
underusage  of costly  inputs,  like  fertilizer,  goes  the  reasoning. Both
effects  slow  the  growth  of output  and  the  development  of the  agricultural
sector. It  has also  been  argued  that since  rural  credit  markets  are
notoriously  imperfect,  access  to  credit  is severely  lirited  for  farmers,
particularly  small  farmers;  without  government  intervention  a  high  price  of
capital  would  prevail,  further  screening  out  the  small  farmers  from  the
credit  markets. Furthermore,  because  of distorted  exchange  rates,  food
price  controls,  imports  of cheap  food  and  inefficient  markets,  farmers
receive  low  prices  for  their  products,  hampering  their  borrowing  abilities.
Credit  programs  generally  aim  to  reach  small  farmers.  However,
despite  the  remarkable  expansion  of credit  throughout  the  rural  areas  of
developing  countries  over  the  last  three  decades,  few  farmers  in  low  income
countries  seem  to  have  received  or benefited  from  such  credit. An
estimated  5  percent  of farms  in  Africa  and  about  15  percent  in  Asia and
Latin  America  have  had  access  to formal  credit. Moreover,  there  seems  to
be a  high correlation  between  credit  recipients  and  size  of land  holdings,
(see  Lipton  (1981)  and  Braverman  and  Guasch  (1986)). The  imposition  of
government  interest  rate  restrictions  (credit  subsidies)  has induced  banks-2-
to ration  credit  in  a  manner  that  excludes  the  small  farmers  from  formal
credit  markets. This is  what  Gonzalez-Vega  (1977)  has  called  *the  iron  law
of interest  rate  restrictions".  Rather  than  equalizing  income  inequality,
low  interest  rate  credit  programs  have increased  it:  on average  5  percent
of  borrowers  have  received  80 percent  of !  :e  credit.
It has  thus  been  common  for  farmers,  p&rticularly  the  small-scale
ones,  to resort  to the  formation  of organized  credit  groups  or
cooperatives.  Although  those  institutions  have  many advantages,  they  have
been  prone  to  encourage  the  wrong  economic  behavior. In terms  of
participation,  productivity,  volume  of credit  and  repayment  rates,  failures
have  outnumbe?:ed  successes.  Given  the  level  of resources  involved  and  the
significance  of economic  developstant  in  rural  areas,  a better  understanding
of these  institutions  is  needed. What follows  is a  normative  analysis  of
cooperatives  viewed  as institutions  organized  to improve  the  plight  of
small-scale  farmers. This  analysis  is  motivated  by the  theory  of
incentives  in  organizations.  The  purpose  is  to analyze  which structures
are  most successful.  Then  a policy  to  pro'-ote  credit  cooperatives  and  help
an  optimal  incentive  design  could  be much  more  effective  than  the
subsidized  credit  policies  of the  past.  After  a brief  description  of  how
credit  tends  to be allocated  iu  rural  markets,  we proceed  to  analyze  the
issues  of formation  and  design  of credit  groups,  in  both static  and  dynamic
settings.
ANALYSIS  OF RURAL  CREDIT  ALLOCATION
Consider  an institution  or financial  intermediary  which  aims  to
allocate  a given  budget  among  a  number  of loan  applications.  For
simplicity,  assume  that  the  demand  for  loans  comes  from  two  types  of rural
agents  or farmers,  small-scale  and large-scale.  The  standard  differences- 3 -
betveen  the  two  types  seem  to be:  a) the  loan  requested  by the  small  agents
is usually  smaller  than  the  one  requested  by the  large  ones;  b) the
collateral  small  agents  can  provide  'u  smaller  than  that  provided  by the
large  ones;  c)  land  holdings  of small  agents  are smaller  (if  not absent)
than  those  of large  ones;  d) information  on past  behavior  is  more extensive
or less  costly  to collect  on large  agents  than  on small  ones;  and  e) the
output  of the  smAall  agents  is  perceived  to  be subject  to greater  variatior,
reflecting  perhaps  the  smaller  and  less  diversified  resource  base  of small
farms.
Loan  processing  has strong  positive  scale  economies. Estimates
show  that  for  small  loans,  processing  costs  can range  from  rcent  to 40
percent  of the  loan  value  (see  Braverman  and  Guasch  (1986)). These  cost
differentials,  plus  the  typical  lack  of collateral  and  the  higher  perceived
riskiness  of the  small  agents,  induces  a bias  against  them  in credit
allocation.  Interest  ceilings  and  limited  budgets  further  strengthen  the
bias.  Interest  restrictions  stop  financial  institutions  from  charging
higher  interest  rates  and  induce  higher  demand  for  credit  from  the  large
agents. Thus  small  agents  face  significant  rationing  or exclusion  from
credit. Their  alternative  is to  use  the  informal  credit  market,  which
usually  lends  at  much  higher  interest  rates,  and  which  also  subjects  the
small  agents  to rationing. In addition,  arbitrariness,  patronage  and
corrupt  practices,  frequently  undertaken  by the  financial  intermediaries,
further  limit  the  access  to credit  of the  small  farmers  (see  e.g.,  Landman
and  Tinnermeir  (1981),  Robert  (1979),  and  Adams  and  Vogel  (1986)).
The  conventional  wisdom  has  been  that  providing  subsidized  credit
would remove  this  bias  and increase  small  farmers'  share  of institutional
credit. Elsewhere  (Braverman  and  Guasch  (1987))  we have argued  against
that  view and  shown  how subsidized  credit  will  reduce  small  farmers'  share,-4-
and  likely  increase  the  informal  credit  market  interest  rate. The  natural
conclusion  is  that  subsidized  credit  should  be abolished.  1/  That  will
ensure  that  small  farmers'  share  of credit  at  the  new  higher  formal  market
rate  will  be increased. In addition,  the  informal  market  rates  they  will
face  might  decrease.  2/  Small  farmers'  will still  face  rationing  since  the
arguments  outlined  above  still  apply  albeit  with somewhat  less  force  (see
Bell  and  Srinivasan  (1985)).  We should  still  expect  to observe  interest
rate  differentials  according  to loan  size  because  of  higher  processing  cost
for  smaller  loans,  and  the  higher  risks  in lending  to small  farmers.
It is  not  our  purpose  here to  dwell  on the  effectiveness  of  credit
policies,  but  rather  to  elaborate  on  actions  that  smL%ll  farmers  can  take  to
improve  their  access  to  credit  and  thus  ultimately  their  welfare. In
particular,  we will focus  on  how credit  groups  can  help.
COOPERATIVES AND CREDIT GROUPS
The  three  main  obstacles  to  obtaining  credit  fer  the  small-scale
agents  are:  1)  much  higher  transaction  costs  per  dollar  lent  for  small
loans;  2) the  belief,  real  or  perceived,  that  small  agents  are  riskier  to
lend  to than  larger  ones  and  3) the  patronage,  corruption  and  arbitrary
decisions  of some  lending  agents  reduce  the  share  of credit  funds  to small
agents. Small-scale  agents  might  form  cooperatives  or credit  groups  to
overcome  these  obstacles.
There  are  many types  of  credit  groups  ranging  from  purely  nominal
or umbrella  organizations  without  much  member  interaction  to those  fully
coordinated  in  all  aspects  of their  operations  including  production
decisions  among  members. Motivation  behind  their  inception,  organizational
structure,  incentive  schemes,  enforcement  procedures,  tradition  and-5-
cultural  legacy,  technological  structure  and  availability  of information
are  important  factors  in  determining  their  effectiveness.
The  advantuges  of credit  groups  are  multiple. They  reduce  the
credit  transaction  costs  of  both lenders  and  borrowers,  enabling  the  group
to offer  strong  economic  incentives  to their  members  such  as lower  interest
rates,  price  discount  on inputs  and  relief  from  individual  processing  of
loans. They  might  promote  scale  economies  in  technical  assistance.  They
might  help  to circumvent  the  effects  of risk,  and  also  give leverage  for
dealing  with the  financial  intermediaries. From the  lenders'  perspective,
they  may reduce  the  risk  of loan  default  because  of the  common  practice  of
joint  liability  among  groups  members.
That  these  advantages  are  clearly  perceived  is  evident  in the
large  number  of cooperatives  that  have  been  established  in  the  agricultaral
sector  in practically  all  countries  since  their  inception  by
F.W.  Raiffeisen  in  Germany  in  1847. However,  results  have  been  mixed,  with
failures  outnumbering  successes.
Why  were there  so  many  failures? Although  largely  an empirical
question,  to answer  it  properly  one  must  first  know  what is the  optimally
designed  credit  group. We focus  below  on the  characterization  of such  a
benchmark  organization,  and  Or.  the  role  and  dlesign  of incentives  in  credit
groups.
THE  INSTITUTIONAL  DESIGN OF  CREDIT  GROUPS
Consider  a collection  of agents,  each  one involved  in  his own
productive  activity,  say,  agriculture,  which  is subject  to  uncertain
factors  and  where  the  inputs  needed  are  capital  and  his  own  effort. In a
general  formulation,  we could  think  of those  agents  as facing  two  distinct
types  of risk. One,  an individual  or specific  risk  which  is  uncorrelated-6-
across  agents  and  with the  other  type  of risk. The second  risk  is comon
to all  agents  or  perfectly  correlated  across  agents. The  most obvious
example  of the  latter  risk  in  agriculture  is  the  variation  in  output  or
yield  cauced  by  weather's  uncS  Lnty,  while  those  caused  by incidence  of
pests  and  other  diseases  would  ,. an example  of the  firs'  type  of risk. We
could  think  then,  of the  random  element  zi.  affecting  i's  output,  as
composed  cf two  terms,  zi - (v,  hi)  where  v is a e:cmmon  (  to all  agents)
uncertainty  parameter,  while  the  hi's  are  independent  idiosyncratic
(specific  to agent  i) risks. Let  Qi (v,  hi, ai,  Ki)  be the  output  for
agent  i,  which  is a function  of the  effort  taken  by the  agent.  ai of the
amount  of capital  utilized  for  production,  Ki and  of the  two  random  factors
v  and hi.
The  agent's  utility  is a function  of income  and  of the  level  of
effort  unde-taken.  Disposable  income  can  be  decomposed  into  two  terms.
One  is  that  obtained  from  the  sale  of  the  output  net  of repayment  of the
loan.  The  other  is given  by the  proportion  of the  loan  the  agent  uses  for
consumption  or other  purposes,  not  directly  linked  with the  productive
activity  under  study. Let  us denote  that  proportion  by C.  Also let  Y be
the  income  obtained  from  the  sal4  of output  net  of repayment  costs. Then,
we can  express  the  utility  as  U((K,  Y, a).  Since  the  availability  of those
two  incomes  is  not  concurrent,  they  are  treated  differently  in the  agent's
utility  function. We assume  preferences  represented  by a  utility  function
separable  in those  variables,  U1(K) + U2(Y)-  V(a),  where  U1 and  U2 are
concave  functions,  and  V is  convex. That  reflects  diminishing  marginal
utility  of income  and  increasing  marginal  disutility  of effort. Y can  be
written  as  Y - PQi - (l+rm)Ki,  where  Q is output,  p is its  market  price,
and  rm  is  the  interest  rate.  Let  t  be  the  credit  limit  the  agents  are-7-
subject  to.  Now  we can  state  the  optimization  problem  solved  by the  agent
operating  on his  own  as,
(I)  Max  U1 (aiKi)  + EU2(y) - V(ai)
ai,  ai,  KRi
s.t.  Y - PQi - (l+rm)Ki
Q - Q(v,  hi,  ai, (1-i)Ki)
o  a  @j S  1
o  K  R  I.
The first  order  conditions  of T, for  an interior  maximum,  are,
,  9
(Ila)  EU;(PQ;l  -Va  - 0
(IIb)  U11 + EU2 tpQQ(-K)]  - 0
(IIC)  Uta  +  EU2[PQK(1-a)  - (1+rm)]  - O
Let  the  optimal  actions  taken  by an agent  not  joining  a  credit  group,  the
solutions  to II,  be denoted  by Km,  am  and  am.  Let the  expected  utility  of
that  action  be  em.  The  higher  am  is the  higher  the  probability  of
insolvency. The  choice  of  higher  a  by agents  has  been  a common  argument
used  to explain  the  failure  of credit  to achieve  its  goal.
Consider  now the  possibility  of agfnts  joining  or forming  a credit
group. The  key characteristic  of the  arrangement  is  that  the  group  assumes
liability  for  any  loans  made to  any  of its  members  or that  it serves  as the
recipient  of all  credit,  which  is then  distributed  among  the  members. The
security  for  credit  repayment  is  usually  provided  by the  joint  liability  of
group  members,  diffusing  the  risk  bias  argument  held against  small  agents.
Credit  to  the  whole  group  is stopped  until  the  default  is  corrected. This-8-
provides  diversification  of risk  And  induces  strong  peer  pressure  for  the
proper  use  of credit  and its  repayment.
The  direct  benefits  to agents  in joining  a credit  group  are  lower
interest  rates  and  presumably  higher  credit  lines. They  are  a  consequence
of two  essential  features  of credit  groups,  joint  liability  and  a
centralized  or block  request  of credit  by the  gro,Ap  as opposed  to a  number
of individual  applications,  thereby  reducing  transaction  costs.
Aside  from  the  lower  costs  of inputs,  another  benefit  the  agents
can  derive  from  joining  a credit  group  is risk-pooling.  The  argument  is
straightforward  particularly  when there  is  no  moral  hazard  problem. Each
agent's  income  is  a random  variable  yi,  with  a given  distribution,  induced
by v and  hi.  For  any  realization  of  ',  the  distribution  of income  of each
agent  is  independent  and  identically  distributed  across  agents,  with
variance  var(y). Suppose  the  structure  of the  group  is  such  that  the
agents'  income  is  pooled  together,  and  that  the  aggregate  proceeds  are
divided  equally  among  the  identical  agents. If theLe  are  n of them  the
variance of the aggregate income is, var 'Y1  +  Y2 +  ...  +  yn) =  n var (y).
Each agent receives (1/n)(y 1 +  Y2 +  ...  +  yn) but the variance of that
income  is,  n  var(y/n)  - var(y)/n.  Thus  the  expected  income  has  not
changed  but  its  variance  has  been  greatly  reduced. With risk  averse
agents,  their  expected  utility  is  now  higher.
The  argument  is  not so simple  when the  agent  can  take  unobservable
actions  affecting  the  distribution  of his  contributed  income  (output),
since  then  expected  income  from  productive  activities  in the  group  regime
will in general  be different. The  tradeoff  is lower  expected  income  but
also  lower  variance. Of course,  the  nonproductive  income  might  be larger.
Let  a,  a and  K be the  agent's  optimal  choices  in the  credit  group  regime.
The  solution  concept  we use  to determine  those  values  is  the  Nash-9-
equilibrium.  An equilibrium  allocation  under  a cre1it  group  regime  can  be
thought  of as  a Nash  equilibrium  of the  game  where  each  agent  computes  his
optimal  borrowing,  consumption  and  production  plan,  given  the  actions  of
the  others  agents  and  knowing  what the  resulting  expected  distribution  of
income  would  be.  That  allocation  has  the  property  than  no one  can  do
better  by deviating  in  his  choice  of actions  given  what the  otiners  are
doing. Then  the  resulting  aggregate  income  is  Yl +  Y2 +  *--  + Yn -
(1+r)nK,  with of course  they  y's  and  K's  being  different  than  the  E  .ces
made  under  an individualistic  regime  of production,  since  there,  agents
were  not  acting  strategically  with respect  to each  other,  and  of course
there  were not  moral  hazard  problems. Here  again  the  agent's  variance  of
income  is reduced  to  var (y  - (l+r)K)/n.  Of course  the  yi's  are  a function
of a,  a,  K and  r.  The  chosen  values  of  y  will depend  on the  institutional
organization  of the  group,  particularly  the  incentive  structure  implemented
by the  group.
Assuming  equal  and  exhaustive  distribution  of the  proceeds  by the
group,  the  problem  solved  by agent  i,  under  the  credit  group  regime,  that
gives rise to the y's is,
(III)  Max  Ul(aiKi)  +  ZU 2(Y) - V(aj) a 1, ai.  K1
s.t.
Y '  [Ei-...  n(PQi  - (l+rc)Kj}]In
Qi = Qi(v,  hi.  ai, (l-ai)Ki)
0  aj  Q  1.
Note  that  this  formulation  captures  the  joint  liability  characteristic  of
the  arrangement.  All the  proceeds  are  pooled  by the  group  and  all  loans
are  paid out  prior  to any  distribution  of income  to the  members. Then,
because  of symmetry,  all  of them  receive  the  same  share,  independent  f
their  own realization  of  output  Qi.  This  formulation  is  not equivalent  to- 10  -
the  one (also  capturing  joint  liability)  where  each  agent  is  allocated  his
net income  less  a  share  of the  debt  from  bankrupt  members  (when
applicable).  The  latter  formulation  induces  lower  expected  utility,
because  of a  higher  variance  on the  realized  income. The  dominance  of the
former  fonmulation  reflects  the  benefits  of risk-pooling.
The first  order  conditions  for  a  maximum  of  problem  III  are,
(IVa)  EU'  PQi )]In  VI - 0
2  aia
(IVb)  1i +  ,U 2 (PQa  (-Ki)]/n  * 0
(IVc)  U;ai  +  2 EPQ'i (1-ai)  -(1 +  rc  -n  - 0
Every  agent  solves  a similar  problem. Tne  Nash  equilibrium
allocation  is the  simultaneous  solution  to the  set  of  n first  order
conditions.  one  for  each  agent.
There  is  now  a  moral  hazard  problem,  since  @i  and  ai are  not
observable  by the  group,  and  thus  cannot  be contracted  for. The  group  only
observes  Ki,  and  aggregate  output. As of  now  we assume  that  the  Qi's  are
not observable  by the  group. Later  we  will relax  this  assumption.
To  make the  claim  that  a credit  group  regime  dominates
individualistic  production  from  the  agent's  standpoint,  we have to  compare
the  expected  utility  levels  under  both regimes,  namely  the  solutions  to
problems  I and  III. The  tradeoffs  are  clear. Under  regime  I, the  agent
acts  unilaterally,  keeping  all  the  proceeds  induced  by  his actions,  but  has
to incur  higher  input  costs,  and  a higher  variance  of income,  ceteris
paribus  and  perhaps  credit  ceilings. While  under  regime  III,  he benefits
from  lower  costs,  lower  variance  but  receives  only  one  n-th  of  his
contribution.  His strategic  behavior  behavior  vis-a-vis  the  other  agents- 11 -
(Nash  non-cooperative)  will tend  to induce  a lower  contribution  towards  the
general  pool.  If  we evaluate  the  first  order  conditions  IV at the  optimal
values  given  by the  solution  to II,  we obtain  that:  i)  the  sign  of IVa  is
negative,  implying  a lower  effort  contribution;  ii)  the  sign  of IVb  is
positive,  implying  that  a  higher  proporuion  of credit  will be allocated  to
nonproductive  activities;  and  iii)  the  sign  of IVc  is  positive,  meaning
that  a larger  amount  of credit  will be requested.
The  allocation  induced  by III,  is  clearly  suboptimal  even  relative
to the  second  best  or co,  tined  efficie.it  one.  The  credit  group  regime
problem  shares  many features  with the  standard  common  ownership  and  team
production  problems. As with those,  the  equilibrium  allocation  is  not
Pareto  optimal. Non-cooperative  behavior  there  usually  yields  an
inefficient  outcome  if joint  output  or liability  is fully  shared  among  the
agents. Everyone's  welfare  can  be improved  by exercising  restraint  in
present  consumption,  and  by increasing  the  productive  activities.  The
source  of the  inefficiency  is that  each  agent  imposes  a  negative
externality  on the  others  by the  diversion  of  ctedit  and  actions  from  the
productive  activity. That  behavior  is  nevertheless  optimal  for  the  agent,
given  the  allocation  rule  of  problem  III,  since  while  he incurs  the full
cost  of the  actions  taken  in the  productive  activity  he receives  only  one-
nth  of the  output;  a similar  argument  applies  for  his  use  of credit  on
productive  and  nonproductive  activities.  That  arrangement  fosters  moral
hazard  and  free  rider  problems,  since  agents  cannot  be induced  to supply
proper  amounts  of  productive  inputs  when their  actions  cannot  be observed
and  contracted  for  directly. Moreover,  a severe  problem  that  can  appear  is
that  the  agents  might  increase  their  credit  demands  and  the  proportion  of
credit  for  other  nonproductive  purposes  (like  current  consumption),  and
decrease  their  effort  contribution,  reducing  the  expected  production  levels- 12 -
so  much that  credit  group  will  be unable  to repay  the  loans. Bankruptcy
and  failure  of the  credit  group  as a  viable  institution  would  be the  end
results. Therefore  it should  be clear  that  the  internal  dynamics  of  the
set  of actions  taken  by the  members  cannot  be ignored,  and  a system  of
incentives  based  on the  acquired  information  ought  to be implemented  to
induce  the  desired  or optimal  actions. The  critical  elements  in  the  design
of incentive  schemes  are  the  nature  of the  information  available,  the
nature  of the  uncertainty  affecting  the  agents'  output,  and  the structure
of production.
The  important  question  then  is  whether  there  are  alternative
institutional  arrangements  and  incentive  mechanisms  that  can  elicit  an
efficient  or  at least  a better  allocation  than  the  one  described  above  for
a credit  group  regime. Presumably  the  larger  the  difference  between  the
allocation  induced  by I and  the  one  induced  by the  credit  group  regime,  the
more attractive  and stable  the  group  will  be.  To resolve  the  question,  we
turn  to the  theory  of incentives  under  imperfect  inrormation  and  moral
hazard. We know  that  in these  situations  the  assignment  of an individual
or entity  to serve  the  role  of a principal  can  reduce  problems
significantly,  since  implementing  other  allocation  rules  can  induce  more
efficient  outcomes  (see  Alchian  and  Dempsetz  (1972),  Mirrlees  (1976),  and
Holmstrom  (1982)).  We can  assign  that  role  to the  credit  group. The  group
is empowered  to  monitor,  allocate  and  implement  incentive  schemes. Given
transaction  costs  and  risk  factors,  delegating  the  monitoring  to one  or all
members  will  enhance  total  output  relative  to  what  could  be achieved  on an
individual  basis. Thus,  even  though  production  will take  place  on an
individual  basis,  the  group  aspect  of the  arrangement  will require  setting-
up incentive  schemes  and  sharing  rules  that  are  usually  associated  with
teams  and structures  under  observability  and  moral  hazard  problems.- 13  -
Moreover,  in  its  role  as  principal,  the  group  can  account  for  any  surplus
or deficit  incurred. This  is essential  since  it  is often  the  case  that
*optimal"  incentive  schemes  do  not  balance  the  budget. Without  that
capacity,  those  schemes  might  not  be implementable.
Under  certainty,  and  where  only  in  aggregate  is  the  outcome
observable,  one  can  construct  a set  of sharing  (the  output-income)  rules,
si(y)  > 0, i  - 1,...,  n, inducing  a Nash  equilibrium  in actions,  which
satisfies  the  conditions  for  Pareto  optimality.  Generally,  they  take  the
following  form:  si (y)  - ci if  y 2 y(a*,  a*,  K*),  and si (y)  - 0  otherwise,
where  the  arguments  of y are  the  Nash  equilibrium  and  Pareto  optimal
actions. If all  the  agents  are  identical  ex-ante,  the  sharing  rules  will
also  be identical  for  all  agents. The  optimal  sharing  rules  are,  in
general,  discontinuous  in  income,  and  need  not  be budget-balancing.  This
latter  feature  is essential  to solve  the  free  rider  problem,  and  to
neutralize  externalities.  It reflects  the  ability  to sufficiently  penalize
deviations  from  the  optimum. The  enforcement  problem  is  then  overcome  by
bringing  in  a principal,  in  our  case  the  credit  group,  which  will assume
the  residual  of the  nonbudget-balancing  sharing  rules  (when  applicable).
Group  incentives  can  also  work  quite  well  under  uncertainty,
particularly  if  the  agents  are  risk-neutral.  Mirrlees  (1974),  and
Holmstrom  (1982)  have shown  that  a first  best  solution  can  be approximated
arbitrarily  closely  by  using  group  penalties. In that  situation,  the
sharing  rules,  in  general,  take  the  following  form:  si (Y)  - siy  if  y 2
and  siy  - ki otherwise,  where  E si  - 1,  and  ki >  0.  The  term  ki describes
the  penalty  to agent  i if  a critical  output  j  is  not reached. The
effectiveness  of these  rules,  however,  is  greatly  reduced  if  there  are  many
agents  and if  they  are  risk  averse. Of course,  the  group  has  the  option  to- 14 -
subdivide  itself  into  several  cells  to  keep the  size  reduced  when
desirable. Under  risk  aversion  and  uncertainty  in  production,  the  first
best  is  usually  not attainable.  Then  monitoring  becomes  quite  important
since  it can  help improve  welfare  and  achieve  an allocation  that
approximates  the  first  best, (see  Holmstrom  (1982)  for  a  general  statement
of the  problem). In our  formulation,  monitoring  should  be a  viable  and
quite  natural  option,  since  observations  by the  group  of each  agent's
output  can  be obtained,  generically  at fairly  low  cost.  31
Let  us consider  now those  situations  where  the information  system
is so  rich  or  monitoring  so  easy  that  total  output  can  be itemized
according  to the  contribution  of each  agent;  this  is the  case  when the  Qi's
are separately  observed;  then,
Q(§,z)  - £iQi(§i.  zi),
where  z  - (zl,...,zn),  § - (§l'...  §n)  and  §i - (ai,  ai,  Ki). If  the  z'is
are  not random  or observable  by everybody,  then  efficiency  can  be achieved
by  holding  each  agent  responsible  for  his  own  output. However,  the  most
frequent  case is  where  the 'lis  are  random  and  not  observable.  Then  the
sharing  rules  are functions  of the  output  and should  describe  the
proportion  of insolvent  loan  claims  to  be assessed  against  agent  i.  In
general,  the  optimal  sharing  rule  of agent  i  will depend  on something  else
than  i's  output. It  will only  depend  on i's  output  alone  if  the  outputs  of
all  agents  are independent.
Generally,  the  optimal  set  of sharing  rules  fsi(y)  i-l  to  n)  will
have si  depend  on some  relative  or average  measure  like  y  and  yi alone
where  7 is  a  weighted  average  of the  agents'  outcomes. The  only
assumptions  needed  to  generate  thetse  results  are  that  v,  hl,...,hn  are
independent  and  normally  distributed.  The  intuition  is that  the  aggregate
measure  of peer  performance  y  captures  all  the  relevant  information  about- 15 -
the  common  uncertainty. In  other  words,  the  aggregate  measure,  y, is  then
a sufficient  statistic.  Clearly,  this  rationalizes  the  common  practice  of
comparing  performance  against  peer  aggregates,  and  basing  compensations
(pecuniary  or  non-pecuniary)  on that  differential.
In those  contests,  incentive  schemes  based  on zelative  output
performance,  or rank-order  tournaments  can  do quite  well as  has  been shown
in Nal .Aff  and  Stiglitz  (1982)  and  Bhattacharya  and  Guasch  (1988).  41
They  can  be utilized,  not  only  to elicit  the  desired  actions,  but also  to
allocate  among  the  members  the  excess  balance  of the  credit  group,  induced
by interest  rate  differentials  or  nonbudget-balancing  rules. A rank-order
tournament  awards  agents  merely  on their  performance  rank,  not  on the  value
of the  output  itself;  thus  it is  based  on ordinality  as opposed  to
cardinality.  An advantage  of this  compensation  scheme  compared  to cthers
based  on cardinality  is that  it requires  less  information  since  only  the
ranking  of the  agents  needs  to  be determined. In  particular,  when all
agents'  output  (the  monitored  variable)  is subject  to a common  (correlated)
risk  or random  variable,  these  reward  (or  penalty)  schemes  automatically
neutralize  that  risk  or adjust  for  its  effects.
A rank  order  tournament  generally  consist  of a set  of  n prizes  q1
2 q2 2...2...  %, one  for  each  agent,  and  an  observable  variable(s)  upon
which  the  ranking  of  the  agents  is  established.  If that  variable  is,  say,
the  output,  then  the  agent  with the  highest  output  receives  ql,  and so  on.
Of course,  some  of the  prizes  can  be penalties.
If the  agents  are  risk  neutral,  a  properly  designed  contest  can
elicit  the  efficient  allocation,  (see  Lazear  and  Rosen  (1981),  and
Bhattacharya  and  Guasch  (1987)  with either  homogenous  or heterogeneous
agents. Moreover,  under  risk  aversion,  such  contests  may be  preferred  to
individualistic  reward  schemes,  particularly  when  the  risk  associated  with- 16 -
the  common  environmental  variable,  v, is large. Again,  the  role  of a
principal  is  essential  for  the  implementation  of these  schemes. Among  the
various  forms  a contest  can  take,  that  with a  penalty  to the  lowest  ranked
individual  will be superior  to  one  with a  prize  to the  highest  ranked
individual  (see  Nalebuff  and  Stiglitz  (1982)  for  an analysis  of relative
effectiveness  of different  types  of tournaments).  5/
DYNAMIC  CONSIDERATIONS
The  analysis  developed  above  has  been largely  static. It  .egs  the
question  of  why agents  do  not 'take  the  money  and  run',  and  limits
enforcement  considerably.  In  a static  framework,  threats  to  agents  for
deoarting  from  the  expected  or  established  course  of action  are  not
credible,  since  they  cannot  be implemented.  By the  time  inferences  or
observitions  can  be  made about  deviant  agsnts,  the  game  is over,  so
retaliation  cannot  take  place. It is  only  in a  dynamic  (infinite  or
uncertain  horizon)  framework  that  stated  punishments  can  be carried  out.
Future  periods  provide  the  place  for  disciplining  agents  who deviated  and
the  agents  can  take  into  account  the  future  consequences  of any  deviations.
A dynamic  analysis  increases  the  viability  of credit  groups.
Given  the  moral  hazard  and  team  problems,  the  success  of the  credit  group
in supporting  a cooperative  scheme  that  is superior  to  an individualistic
one  lies  in its  ability  to  punish  any  defector  from  the scheme. In  this
section,  we extend  the  previous  analysis  to an environment  where  each
agent,  within  a credit  group  regime,  repeatedly  sets  his choice  variables.
The  group  responds  to such  choices. This  becomes  a repeated  game  and  since
we are  considering  an infinite  number  of repetitions,  it is  a supergame.
The  environment  does  not  change  and  decisions  can  be made  contingent  on
past  outcomes  of the  game.- 17 -
In our structure,  the  credit  group  cannot  perfectly  observe  or
infer  the  actions  ai and  ai  taken  by the  agents. Then  the  natural
strategies  for  the  credit  group  to  consider  are  trigger  output  or review.
Mentioned  by Stigler  (1964),  their  general  formulation  has  been  developed
by Green  and  Porter  (1984)  in repeated  collusive  market  games  and  by Radner
(1985)  in repeated  games  with imperfect  monitoring  and  moral  hazard,  and
are  most appropriate  in  formulations  with informational  imperfections.  Our
formulation  is  a hybrid  of those  two  types  of  problems. While  each  agent
prob.  m  is  more like  a repeated  moral  hazard  problem,  the  fact  that  it  has
consequences  for  group  welfare  (the  expected  utility  of a  member  of the
group  depends  positively  on the  size  of the  group)  brings  in the  market
element.
Under  trigger  output  strategies,  each  agent  selects  his level,
agreed  by the  group,  of  unobservable  actions,  until  his output  (if
observable  by the  group)  or the  aggregate  output  falls  below  a  certain
specified  trigger  output  Q*,  during  some  period. Then,  in the  former  case,
that  or those  agents  whose  output  falls  below  that  selected  trigger
benchmark  is or  are forced  out  of the  credit  group  for  T-1  periods. After
T periods,  the  agent(s)  is/(are)  allowed  to return  to the  credit  group,  to
resume  cooperation  and so  on.  If aggregate  output  is  the  only  observable
variable,  when  output  Zalls  below  its  trigger  value  the  credit  group  is
dismantled  for  the  T-1  periods. After  T  periods,  the  credit  group  resumes
operations.  The  analysis  below  deals  with this  latter  case,  but it  also
fits  the  former  when the  expected  utility  for  any  agent  in the  group  does
not depend  on the  number  of  members. This  would  be the  case  if the  group
is quite  large. Then,  at the  margin  or inframargin  the  variation  is
negligible  since  all  the scale  effects  are  exhausted  at a relatively
smaller  size.  Otherwise,  we need to  keep  account  of the  size  of the  group- 18  -
and  corresponding  probabilities.  Our  choice  is based  on  ease  of
exposition.
A trigger  output  scheme  is  characterized  by four  parameters,
assuming  identical  agents,  a*,  a*,  Q*,  and  T.  Note  that  the  capital  or
loan  principal  K,  need  not  be part  of it  since  it is  observable,  and  can  be
forced  to the  agent  at the  onset  of each  period. The  problem  for  the
credit  group  is,  then,  to select  values  of those  parameters  in order  to
induce  the  highest  possible  expected  utility  for  each  agent. Deviations
from  agreed  actions  are  undesirable  to the  group  because  they  might  lead  to
insolvency  of the  agent. Then  because  of the  joint  liability,  the  group
has to  cover  the  losses.
Let  Cc be the  agent's  expected  payoff  per  period  under  cooperative
behavior  in  the  credit  group  regime. Let  Om be the  expected  payoff  per
period  when operating  on  his  own.  Let  o be the  discount  rate  and  p  the
induced  probability  of  having  a realization  of output  below  the  trigger
level. The  distribution  of that  probability  depends  on  a, a, K, the
trigger  output  Q*,  and  the  random  variables  v and  h.
The  overall  expected  utility  ff  to  each  agent  is  given  implicitly
by:
U - UC +  (1  - at)  U  +  p  (OM (o  +  ...  +  1T-l)  +  UTU).
It contains  three  elements:  (1)  the  current  expected  payoff  from  agreed  or
cooperative  behavior;  (2)  the  expected  utility  starting  next  period  when
the  credit  group  is still  operating,  discounted  by the  probability  of that
event,  namely  that  the  output  is  above  the  specified  level  and (3)  the
expected  utility upon  the  credit  group  being  dissolved  for  T-1  periods,
and  resuming  operations  thereafter  affected  by the  probability  of that- 19  -
event. Solving  for  0,  we  obtains
e-  E  (11  (1-))  (MC (1-0)  +  fMp(o-oT)/((l)  +  p(q-T))
further  manipulations  yield:
a  -,  [ (f3m(l-r))  +  (ftc  - Om)I((l-u)  +  p(q-qT))J
with the  two  terms  being,  first  the  expected  utility  from  the
individualistic  regime  from  now  on,  and  second,  the  single  period  gains
accruing  each  period  from  now  on from  the  cooperative  behavior,  properly
discounted.
Then  the  credit  group  problem  is:
max  0  - max  [(ftml (1-0r))  +  (fic  - em) I ()(l-o)  +  p(a-gT))
-t-,  - (U4/aai)  1a*  i  d°(OPI84i)  ( (C  _cO/m(-Gr+Pf)  ).
and,
(Ofi/ai)la*  i  U(5PIjai)((Oc  -
where  the  first  constraint  guarantees  that  it  will  not  be possible  to
increase  the  agent's  expected  utility  by increasing  the  share  of capital
for  nonproductive  purposes  beyond  a*.  The  second  constraint  states  that
the  agent  cannot  increase  his expected  utility  by decreasing  his  effort
below  a*.  The solution  of this  problem  will  determine  a*,  O*,  Q*,  and  T*
which  provides  for  the  maximum  expected  utility  and  makes  the  credit  group
sustainable.
It could  well  be that  the  optimal  solution  is  to set  T  equal  to
infinity. Then  if the  output  level  falls  below  a certain  specified  trigger
level  Q*,  the  credit  group  is dissolved  forever. However,  that  policy
might  not always  be optimal,  since  it  might  induce  agents  to  make  excessive
efforts,  when  on average  they  all  can  be made  better  off  by selecting  a- 20 -
finite  T.  It  depends  on the  discount  rate  and  the  difference  betweeen  rim
and  eC.  The  characteristics  of the  solution  to  problem  V, are  as follows.
For  risk  averse  agents,  the  resulting  allocation  generates  higher  levels  of
utility  than  those  induced  in  the  static  framework. In equilibrium,  agents
do not  deviate  from  agreed  actions,  but  excluding  agents  or dissolving  the
group  takes  place  every  now  and  then,  during  periods  cf 'bad'  realizations
of the  random  variable  affecting  production.  It is optimal  for  agents  to
supply  less  effort  or less  expected  output  than  the  levels  they  would
choose  if  operating  alone  but  under  the  same  terms  (interest  rate)  of the
credit  group. Agents  go through  alternative  phases  of  being  in the  credit
group  and  operating  outside  the  group. While  the latter  phase  is
deterministic,  lasting  T-1  periods,  the  former  phase  has random  length.
The  optimal  length  of exclusion  or  dissolution  might  be infinite.  6/
Another  advantage  of the  dynamic  formulation  of the  problem  is that  to
implement  the  allocation  stated  above,  the  credit  group  need  not  have  as
large  a degree  of  control  as it is required  to implement  the  sharing  rules
or contest  induced  allocations  in  the  static  forwulation.
EMPIRICAL  EVIDENCE
The  empirical  evidence  on credit  cooperatives  is quite  extensive
and  rather  a  mixed  bag. Examples  of successful  cooperatives  and  credit
groups  abound,  particularly  in  East  Asia. A large  number  of credit
programs  in  that  region  have  achieved  most  of their  objectives,
particularly  in reaching  a large  number  of small  agents,  having  high
repayment  rates  and  increasing  output  in  a cost-effective  manner. Besides
early  land  reform,  the  success  of rural  credit  programs  in  Korea,  Taiwan
and  Japan  have  been frequently  attributed  to strong  village  cooperative
systems  which  have  provided  significant  incentives  to participate  and- 21 -
comply,  as  well  as credible  enforcement  procedures. Peer  esteem  and social
norms  served  the  role  of an effective  incentive  scheme. Other  successful
examples  are  scattered  throughout  different  countries,  like  Kenya,  Malawi,
Nicaragua,  etc.  The  success  there  can  be attributed  to a  much  better
incentive,  control  and  monitoring  systems  (see  von  Pischke,  Adams  and
Donalds  (1983).
Unfortunately,  however,  the  empirical  evidence  also  indicates  that
the  number  of failed  cooperatives  is  extraordinarily  large. Thailand  is  a
typical  example. Despite  the  extensive  cooperative  network  in Thailand  and
the  government's  significant  involvement  in their  development,  the  success
rate  has ranged  from  mediocre  to poor. The  reasons  are  the  followingt
first,  a lack  of sense  of  belonging  and  joint  responsibility  by  most
members. Cooperatives  are  perceived  as  merely  nominal  organizations.
Second,  cooperatives  lack  efficient  administration  and  are  short  on
incentive  schemes.  Dishonesty  is quite  common  amongst  officials. Third,
there  is  not  much coordination  with the  financial  intermediary.  Fourth,
there  does  not seem  to be  much  coordination  between  the  credit,  marketing
and  production  activities  within  the  cooperative.  Last,  their  large  size
and  lack  of proper  monitoring  activities  coupled  with the  perception  by
members  that  credit  funds  are  more like  grants  or aid  given  by the  state
induces  detachment,  high  delinquency  rates  and  the  improper  use of funds.
Poor  performance  such  as Thailand  exhibits-Leven  relative  to individual
farmers--is  quite  disturbing,  since  we tend  to think  of cooperatives  as an
effective  tool  for  rural  development  and  for  improving  the  plight  of small
farmers. Delinquency  rates  through  the  last  decade  have ranged  from  35
percent  for  individual  farmers  to 60  percent  for  farmers'  cooperatives  and
associations  on average.- 22  -
The  viability  of any  credit  organization  is strongly  linked  to its
success  in recovering  loans. Strong  punitive  measures  and  a  proper  set  of
incentives  ought  to be implemented  to induce  high repayment  rates;  those
elements  seem  to be lacking  in  most  credit  cooperatives,  thus  the  high
failure  rates. Most empirical  studies  of credit  group  programs  in rural
areas  in developing  countries  report  low  recovery  rates. Defining  default
or  non-performing  loans  as those  loans  that  are  still  on the  books,  but  are
past due  by 90  days  or  more,  are  non-accruing,  or  have  been renegotiated,
those  studies  have indicated  default  rates  ranging  from  20  percent  to 95
percent  for  credit  programs  in  Africa,  the  Middle  East,  and  Latin  America.
Similar  results  have  been  reported  in  South  and  Southeast  Asia, (see
Braverman  and  Guasch,  1986).  To some  extent,  the  reasons  for  those  high
levels  of default  can  be attributed  to a lack  of  properly  designed
incentive  schemes,  lack  of enforcement  procedures  and  quite  often  to  a
self-serving  confusion  on the  farmer's  part  regarding  the  nature  of  credit.
It is  not  unusual  for  them  to  perceive  the loans  as  grants  or  welfare. In
fact,  in some  South  Asian  languages  the  word  used  for  loans  from  government
institutions  (tagai,  taccari)  means  assistance,  grant". Thus  the
reluctance  to repay  those  loans  should  not  be surprising.
CONCLUSIONS
We have  presented  an  analysis  of the  motivation,  formation  and
design  of credit  cooperatives.  We have shown  that  they  can  provide
significant  advantages  to their  members,  insofar  as their  intzinsic
informational  and  moral  hazard  problems  are  properly  accounted  for.
Particular  care  to the  design  of incentive  mechanisms  is  warranted  if
credit  cooperatives  are  to  prove  successful.  The  incentive  schemes,  degree
of control,  enforcement  and  information  gathering  by  the  credit- 23 -
cooperatives  are  most important  to  predict  the  likelihood  of success.
Long-term  arrangements,  rather  than  one-shot  liaisons  can  provide  higher
benefits  to the  members  and  financial  viability  to the  organization.
We have also  mentioned  the  empirical  relevance  of those  forms  of
organizations,  describing  some  of both  successful  and  unsuccessful
ventures. By and  large,  the  elements  that  we have  been  able  to identify  as
present  in  the  successful  incentive  schemes,  control  of resources,  quality
monitoring  and  enforcement  of  punishing  rules. We believe  that  a  policy  of
providing  assistance  to  existing  and  potential  credit  groups  on  how to set
incentives,  implement  monitoring  schemes  and  develop  centralized  control  of
resources,  is  most desirable  and  should  receive  highest  priority.
Moreover,  it is  better  and  much  more  cost  effective  than  the  old  fashioned
and largely  regressive  subsidized  credit  policies. It is just  as important
to address  the  political  rigidities  that  so  often  hamper  genuine
cooperative  promotion.- .4  -
FOOTNOTES
The  arguments  are  as follows. The  lower  the  r is,  the  larger  the
demands  from  both  types  of agents  for  institutional  funds. As
stated  above,  on purely  efficiency  grounds,  if  there  is  need for
rationing,  the  small  agents  will be the  affected  ones. Moreover,
the  larger  the  difference  between  r and  the "free"  market,  the
more attractive  the subsidized  loans  (the  larger  the  income
transfer)  are  and  the  stronger  the  pressures  put  upon  the  lending
institution  by the  larger  agents. As a result,  the  share  of the
institutional  funds  going  to small  agents  will  decrease  as the
rate  r decreases  and  in consequence,  the  demand  for  credit  by the
small  agents  in  the informal  market  will increase.
2/  If indeed  reaching  a large  number  of small  agents  is one  of the
main objectives  of credit  policies,  another  option  is to intervene
directly  in the  credit  market  by setting  targets  or quotas  in  the
composition  of the  inetitution's  loan  portfolio. Then  a
proportion  of the  funds  allocated  to the  institution  is earmarked
for  the  small  agents. A more  detailed  intervention  mighc.  entail  a
description  of the  number  of  agents  to  be reached  as  well as  the
size  of the  individual's  loan  to be allocated. Incentives  to
induce  compliance  will  need  to be developed. They  can  take  the
form  of tying  future  availability  of  public  funds  to the
institution's  portfolio  composition  and  performance.  Another
option  would  be to  offer  interest  rate  rebates  on loans  granted  to
the  targeted  groups  of agents  up to a  certain  proportion  or  volume
of funds;  this  is  equivalent  to subsidizing  targeted  loans  ex-post
to  neutralize  the  higher  transaction  cost  and  risk  arguments.
3/  Alternative  budget-balancing  sharing  rules  that  might  prove
effective  if  the  agents  are sufficiently  risk  averse  are  those
where  all  the  agents  but  one (randomly  chosen)  are  penalized,  a
massacre  contract,  or those  where  one  agent  (randomly  chosen)  is
severely  penalized,  a scapegoat  contract,  whenever  the  output
falls  below  the  desired  level. Their  effectiveness  has  been  shown
by Rasmussen  (1987)  in the  absence  of production  uncertainties.  A
problem  with those  rules  is  that  they  might  require  the  agents  to
have  significant  wealth  endowments.
4/  Following  upon  the  early  work of  Lazear  and  Rosen  (1981),  and
Bhattacharya  (1982),  the  optimality  of  tournament  contracts  in
that  context  has  been  shown  for  hteterogeneous  agents  by
Bhattacharya  and  Guasch  (1988)  and  for  a restricted  scenario  in
which  marginal  productivity  of effort  is  not  affected  by common
shocks,  in  Green  and  Stokey  (1983),  whereas  Lazear  and  Rosen
(1981)  and  Nalebuff  and  Stiglitz  (1983)  have  compared  tournaments
with linear  piece-rates  contracts.
5/  For  a game-theoretic  analysis  of individual  .ncentives  to form
cooperatives,  see  Sexton  (1986),  and  Staatz  1983). These  studies
depart  from  the  traditional  organization-oriented  approach  to
cooperative  analysis  and  emphasize  tti  core  of the  game  as the
viable  solution  or allocation.  The  idea  is that  since  there  are
gains  to  be realized  by forming  a  cooperative,  relative  to each
one  acting  independently,  one  has to  consider  how the  gains  ought- 25 -
to be allocated  among  the  members,  particularly  when they  are  not
identical. In  addition,  for  a  view  of the  traditional  analysis  of
cooperatives  and  of its  motivations  see,  e.g.,  Helmberger  and  Hoos
(1962),  and  Vitaliano  (1983).
61  A generalization  of the  trigger-price  strategies  models  has  been
developed  by  Abreu,  Pearce  and  Stacchetti  (1986),  where  they
characterize  the  optimal  strategies.  They  take  a fairly  simple
form. The  punishment  phase  last  only  one  period  and  carries  a
more severe  punishment  than  unilateral  production. Its  usefulness
in our  framework  is questionable  since  punishments  more severe
than  exclusion  from  the  group  might  not  be implementable.  A
policy  to force  the  defector(s)  to  work as bonded  labor  for  a
period  might  not  be sustainable.- 26 -
Ref  erences
Abreu,  D.,  D. Pearce  and  E. Stafchetti,  (1986),  *Optimal  Cartel  Equilibria
with Imperfect  Monitoring",  Journal  of Economic  Theory,  39,  251-
269.
Adams,  D.W.,  and  R.C.  Vogel,  (1986),  'Rural  Financial  Markets  in  Low  Income
Countries:  Recent  Controversies  and  Lessons",  World  Development,
14(4).
Alchian,  A. and  H. Demsets,  (1972),  'Production,  Information  Costs,  and
Economic  Organizations,  American  Economic  Review,  62.
Bell,  C. and  T.N.  Srinivasan,  (1985),  'Transactions  in Rural  Credit  Markets
in Bihar  and  Punjab:  An Anatomy',  mimeo.
Bhattacharya,  S. (1982),  'Aspects  of  Monetary  and  Banking  Theory  and  Moral
Hazard',  Journal  of Finance,  May.
Bhattacharya,  S. and  J.L.  Guasch,  (1988),  'Heterogeneity,  Tournaments  and
Limited  Liability Constraints",  Journal  of Political  Economy,
August.
Braverman,  A. and  J.L.  Guasch,  (1986),  'Rural  Credit  Markets  and
Institutions  in  Developing  Countries:  Lessons  for  Policy  Analysis
from  Practice  and  Modern  Theory',  World  Development,  14(10),  1253-
1267.
Braverman,  A. and  J.L.  Guasch,  (1987),  *Rural  Credit  Reforms:  Evidence  of
Past  Failures  and  Methodology  for  Analyzing  Institutional
Reforms',  World  Bank,  Washington,  DC.
Gonzalez-Vega,  C., (1983)  *Arguments  for  Interest  Rate  Reform'  in  J.D.  von
Pischke,  Adams  and  Donalds.
Green,  E. and  R. Porter,  (1984),  "Noncooperative  Collusion  Under  Imperfect
Price  Information%,  Econometrica,  52,  87-100.
Green,  J. and  N. Stokey,  (1983),  "A Comparison  of  Tournaments  and
Contracts',  Journal  of Political  Economy,  June.
Helmberger,  P. and  S.  Hoose (1962),  'Cooperative  Enterprise  and
Organizational  Theory",  Journal  of  Farm  Economy,  44,  275-90.
Holmstrom,  B., (1982),  'Moral  Hazard  in  Teams",  Bell  Journal  of  Economics,
13(2),  324-340,  Autumn.
Hossain,  Mahabub,  (1986),  'Credit  for  Alleviation  of Rural  Poverty:  The
Experience  of Graemeen  Bank  in Bangladesh',  International  Food
Policy  Research  Institute,  Washington,  DC.
Landman,  J.R.,  and  R.L.  Tinnermeier,  (1981),  'The  Political  Economy  of
Agricultural  Credit:  The  Case  of Bolivia',  American  Journal  of
Agricultural  Economics,  63(1),  66-72.- 27 -
Lazea&,  E., and  S.  Rosen,  (1981),  'Rank-Order  Tournaments  as Optimal  Labor
Contracts",  Journal  of Political  Economv,  89(5),  October.
Mirrlees,  J., (1976),  'The  Optimal  Structure  of Incentives  and  Authority
within  an Organization",  Bell  Journal  of Economics,  7 (1),  Spring.
Nalebuff,  B.,  and  J.E.  Stiglitz,  (1983),  'Prizes  and  Incentives:  Towards  a
General  Theory  of Compensation  and  Comwvtition',  Bell  Journal  of
Economics,  14,  21-43,  Spring.
Porter,  R.H., (1983),  'Optimal  Cartel  Trigger-Price  Strategies',  Journal  of
Economic  Theory,  29,  313-338.
Radner,  R., (1985),  'Repeated  Principal-Agent  Games  with  Discounting',
Econometrica,  53,  1173-1198.
Raiffeisen,  F.W.,  (1966),  The  Credit  Unions  as Means  to Remedy  the  Distress
of the  Rural  Ponulation  as  well as  of the  Urban  Crafstman  and
Workers,  The  Raiffeisen  Printing  and  Publishing  Co.,  Neuwied  on
the  Rhine,  Germany.
Rasmussen,  E., (1987),  *Moral  Hazard  in  Risk  Averse  Teams',  The  Rand
Journal  of Economics,  18(3),  Autumn,  428-435.
Robert,  B.,  Jr., (1979),  "Agricultural  Credit  Cooperatives:  Rural
Development  and  Agrarian  Politics  in  Madras,  1893-1937',  Indian
Economic  and  Social  History  Review,  16,  2, 163-189.
Sexton,  R.J. (1986). 'The  Formation  of  Cooperatives:  a  Game-theoretic
Approach  with Implications  for  Cooperative  Finance,  Decision-
Hiking  and  Stability",  American  Journal  of  Asricultural  Economics,
68(2),  214-225.
Staatz,  J.M.,  (1983),  'The  Cooperative  as a  Coalition:  A Game-Theoretic
Approach',  American  Journal  of  Airicultural  Economics,  65(5),
1084-1089.
Stigler,  G., (1964),  'A  Theory  of Oligopoly",  Journal  of Political  Economy,
72,  44-61.
Vitaliano,  P., (1983),  'Cooperative  Enterprise:  An  Alternative  Conceptual
Basis  for  Analyzing  a Complex  Institution",  American  Journal  of
Agricultural  Economics,  65(5),  1078-1083.
von  Pischke,  J.D.,  (1983),  'A  Penny  Saved:  Kenya's  Cooperative  Savings
Scheme',  in  von  Pischke,  Adams  and  Donalds.
von  Pischke,  J.D.,  D.W.  Adams  and  G. Donalds,  (1983),  Rural  Financial
Markets  in  Developing  Countries,  The  Johns  Hopkins  University
Press,  Baltimore.Polac,Pnning,  *nd  Rorch
Agricultural Policy
Few smallholders have obtained credit from  of success, policies to promote appropriate
formal sources - this, despite the remarkable  designs could be much more effective than
expansion of credit throughout the rural areas of  mere subsidies, the predominant policy instru-
developing countries over the last three dec-  ment so far.
ades. They have been largely screened out of
formal credit by higher transaction costs,  More specifically, the focus of such policies
greater perceived risks, and patronizing lenders.  should be on the optimal nature and scope of
joint-liability arrangements, on the gathering
To overcome these obstacles, small-scale  and use of information in setting incentives, and
farmers have formed organized credit groups  on the rigidity of enforcement rules.
and cooperatives. But such endeavors have
frequently failed.  This paper is a product of the Agricultural
Policies Division, Agriculture and Rural
This paper takes new developments in the  Development Department. Copies are available
theory of incentives and organizations and  free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW,
applies them to the institutional design of credit  Washington DC 20433. Please contact Cecily
cooperatives.  Spooner, room J2-084, extension 37570. The
paper will also appear in Pranab Bardhan (ed.),
Because the proper design of these organi-  Economic Theoryfor  Agrarian Institutions,
zations considerably increases their likelihood  Oxford University Press (forthcoming).
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